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Tuesday, April 5, 2011

the theology chronicles

The usual reasons for rejecting fatalism are because 1) it's impersonal and 2) it renders the human will useless and therefore functionally non-existant. calvinists argue that determinism is different from fatalism because it's not impersonal and the human will is real and important, even if it remains superfulous. I'm not convinced they're actually different. the fact that there is a person behind the machine doesn't make determinism any less impersonal. humans are still reduced to non-persons, so it remains impersonal. also, saying that (somehow) the human will is real and important, without giving explanation as to how or why it could be important while being superfulous, seems more like a hopeful fan-made tack-on then a legitimate distinction. anytime a will loses its ability to choose, direct, originate independently, it ceases to be a will ... it ceases to be a self. ultimately, i think determinism/fatalism/whatever results in an obliteration of self. The concept of self requires that there be a distinction in will, creative movement, and identity that is unique to a single entity. If we want to maintain that we are selves, that there's more than just one self who's impacting this world and all it's messes, we have to maintain the reality of our selves. Certainly, the concept of the Creator-creation distinction requires that there be limitations on the affective power of the created selves' wills. And certainly these wills are sometimes frustrated in their secondary ability to execute their designs, but they are never frustrated in their primary ability to design. Or at least, those are my thoughts right now.